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RUMIAAB/COMSOCCENT INTEL MACDILL AFB FL//J2-X//
INFO RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL//THEATER TRAVEL CELL//
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP SPECIAL AREA CLEAR//
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC//DNS//
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC//DHO-6//

UNCLAS AMMAN 001172

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SENSITIVE
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CITE: U-072-08

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: [OREP](#) [AMGT](#) [OTRA](#) [ASEC](#) [AFIN](#) [JO](#)
SUBJECT: COUNTRY CLEARANCE APPROVAL- COSTA+3

REF: FM COMSOCCENT INTEL MACDILL AFB//J2-X// 251419Z MAR 08

¶1. (SBU) Embassy Amman warmly welcomes the visit of COL CHRISTOPHER COSTA+3 TO AMMAN, DURING THE PERIOD OF 26 APR 08 - 1 MAY 08, as requested in reftel. The travelers should carefully review this message, especially the threat assessment at paragraph 9.

¶2. On October 1, 2007, the Department of State electronic country clearance (eCC) application was deployed for all U.S. Government travelers. eCC is the official channel to request country clearance. All agencies and visitors are requested to use eCC to request country clearance in the future.

¶3. (SBU) Control officer for this visit is BRADY, SHANNON, SFC, USA, OPSNCO, USDAO AMMAN. OFFICE TELE: 011-962-6-590-6528; MOBILE TELE: 011-962-79-666-7672. E-MAIL ADDRESS: BRADYSM@STATE.GOV. The Embassy's after-hours telephone number is +962-6-590-6500.

¶4. (SBU) HOTRES and Airport Expeditior/Transportation Support: All lodging, expeditor and transportation support requirements for the duration of the TDY period have been arranged via control officer. Due to security concerns in Jordan (paragraph 8), TDY personnel are assigned hotels on a rotational basis. Therefore, Embassy Amman will make the final decision on hotel accommodations for all visitors.

¶5. (U) Valid visas are required for entry into Jordan. Visas may be obtained at Queen Alia airport though not at all land border crossings; however, Embassy Amman suggests visitors obtain their visas prior to arrival, as there can be long queues for visa issuance at the airport. Money can be exchanged at Queen Alia airport or in the delegation's control room.

¶6. (U) Action request: Each visitor, regardless of length of stay, must bring/forward fiscal data to pay for direct costs of the visit. Each agency, organization or visiting delegation will be charged for the actual costs attributed to its visit. Direct charge costs include, but are not limited to: American and LES overtime (for such services as airport expediting, cashier accommodation exchange, control room staffing, representational event support), travel and per diem costs incurred by post personnel in support of visitor's field travel, rental of vehicles and other equipment, long distance telephone calls, office supplies, gasoline and other vehicle maintenance costs, departure tax and other airport fees. Post will not provide service if fiscal data is not provided for the direct charges. For TDYers remaining at post over 30 days, there is a charge for ICASS support services. This charge is for the following ICASS services: Basic Package, CLO and Health Services. Agencies will not be billed until the accumulated invoice cost for TDY support exceeds \$2,500 for the fiscal year. If your sponsoring agency is not signed up for ICASS services at post, please be prepared to sign a

Memorandum of Understanding for ICASS support services upon arrival. The agency should provide post with a written communication, generated by the traveler's headquarters, that confirms the agency will pay ICASS charges for the TDYer, provides the agency ICASS billing code the TDY support charges should be applied to, and authorizes the traveler to sign the ICASS invoice generated by the TDY module. Where travel is urgent, the TDYer should bring this documentation with him/her to ensure there are no interruptions in the provision of service. Post will not provide any service to a TDYer staying in excess of thirty days without provision of this documentation before day 31 of the TDY.

17. (U) HEALTH: H5N1 avian flu was confirmed in poultry in Jordan in March 2006, and in the same month, the Government of Jordan confirmed a human case of H5N1 avian flu in a person who was infected in Egypt and traveled to Jordan while sick. The World Health Organization declared Jordan to be free of avian flu in May 2006. There have been no confirmed cases of avian flu in people or birds in Jordan since the summer of 2006. Further cases of avian flu in both people and birds in Jordan remain possible. For this reason and for normal health precautions, visitors are encouraged to avoid live poultry, poultry farms, and any dead birds. Visitors should use hand sanitizer and wash hands frequently. Travelers should also patronize restaurants having high standards for food safety and hygiene, and ask that poultry and egg products be cooked thoroughly.

Although Jordan does not pose any unusual health hazards for visitors, the quality of health care facilities is not up to the U.S. or European standards, particularly outside of Amman. As medications on the local economy are often in short supply, visitors should bring sufficient medications to post for their chronic medical problems. Immunizations should be current for Tetanus and Diphtheria, Hepatitis A and B. Visitors should drink bottled water rather than tap water. Food in the hotels and most restaurants is safe to eat, but some of the smaller local restaurants do not always observe proper food handling procedures.

Only those personnel covered under the State Department's medical program and who have a valid medical clearance for Jordan are eligible for a medical evacuation at USG cost. All other visitors are advised to have their own medical evacuation insurance to cover evacuation by air ambulance. Otherwise it will be necessary to ensure that the respective agency will cover any costs related to a medical evacuation. All local hospitals take major credit cards.

18. (U) SECURITY CLEARANCE AND BUILDING ACCESS: In compliance with State Department regulations and Embassy policies, visitors requesting unescorted access to the Embassy compound should inform RSO Amman of their security clearance level (if any) and should name the agency that granted that clearance. Telegrams containing this information should include the "ASEC" tag to ensure distribution to the RSO.

Electronic devices: RSO approval must be obtained before any electronic device is brought into the Embassy. Privately owned laptops and personal computers, peripherals, diskettes, and tapes are prohibited in all mission facilities. Cellular/mobile phones and palm pilots are prohibited in controlled access areas.

Travelers with USG-owned unclassified laptops or notebook computers, peripherals, diskettes, and tapes must receive RSO/IMO authorization before being granted access to U.S. Mission buildings. USG-owned classified computers must be sent to post via classified diplomatic pouch. Classified equipment must bear external USG bar-code inventory numbers and classification markings commensurate with the highest level of information processed on the system. Questions concerning other types of electronic devices and magnetic media may be directed to the RSO and IMO.

Mandatory personal security training: Per 04 STATE 66580, all employees traveling to post for 30 days or more (whether PCS or TDY) must have completed the mandatory personal security training (State Department Security Overseas Seminar or equivalent) before arriving at post. Agencies must provide the Chief of Mission with certification that this training will be completed prior to the employee's travel. Failure to do so will result in denial of country clearance.

19. (U) THREAT ASSESSMENT: The threat of terrorism remains high in Jordan. Transnational terrorist groups, as well as less sophisticated local elements, have demonstrated the capability to pose threats in Jordan. The Al-Qaida in Iraq network is of particular concern for terrorist activities against U.S. and Government of Jordan (GOJ) targets in Jordan. The Al-Qaida in Iraq network claimed responsibility for the November 9, 2005 bombings of three international hotels in Amman, which killed 60 people and injured over 100. Pedestrian suicide bombers wearing explosive vests carried the bombs into the hotels. Al-Qaida in Iraq also claimed responsibility for the Aqaba rocket attacks on August 19, 2005 targeting a U.S. naval ship, which killed one Jordanian soldier and wounded another. The assassination of American diplomat Larry Foley outside his west Amman residence on October 28, 2002 was also attributed to Al-Qaida in Iraq leader Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, who was killed in Iraq in June 2006.

In addition, there has been a series of confirmed terrorist threats and disrupted terrorist plots targeting U.S. or Jordanian interests in Jordan. In November 2006, the GOJ arrested four men who were planning to use a taxi cab to identify and assassinate an American. In the same month, the GOJ arrested three men who were reportedly plotting to attack the U.S. Embassy and assassinate President Bush during his visit to Jordan. In February 2006, the GOJ disrupted a terrorist cell plotting to attack Queen Alia International Airport. In November 2005, the GOJ indicted six men for planning to carry out attacks against Americans at hotels and bars in Amman and Aqaba. In August-September 2005, four militants were arrested for plotting assassinations of Americans in Jordan. In July 2005, GOJ authorities arrested 17 men who had planned to assassinate GOJ officials and Americans in Jordan; the group was reportedly linked to Al-Qaida in Iraq. In February 2005, four men were arrested for plotting attacks against GOJ officials, tourists and five-star hotels. In the same month, another group was disrupted while plotting to attack liquor stores in Amman and foreign tourists in Aqaba.

Terrorists often do not distinguish between U.S. government personnel and private citizens. Terrorists may target areas frequented by Westerners, such as tourist sites, hotels, restaurants, bars, nightclubs, liquor stores, shopping malls, transportation hubs, places of worship, expatriate residential areas, and schools. In light of these security concerns, U.S. citizens are urged to maintain a high level of vigilance, to be aware of their surroundings, and to take appropriate steps to increase their security awareness. It is especially important for travelers to be unpredictable by varying their times and routes and to maintain a low profile. Moreover, U.S. citizens are urged to avoid contact with any suspicious or unfamiliar objects and to immediately report the presence of such objects to the authorities. U.S. Government personnel overseas have been advised to take the same precautions.

Anti-American and anti-Western sentiment exists in Jordan and has been sparked on occasion by incidents in the region, particularly those related to Israeli/Palestinian issues and, to a lesser extent, Iraq. This may lead to random acts of violence against Westerners. On September 4, 2006, a gunman fired on foreigners at a popular tourist site in central Amman, killing one and injuring six.

Travelers are advised to avoid any demonstrations or large gatherings of people. Many demonstrations occur near mosques after Friday prayers. Consequently, special sensitivity and caution should be exercised at or near mosques and religious sites during holy days and the Friday Muslim Sabbath. Demonstrations also often take place at universities and refugee camps.

Crime is generally not a serious problem for travelers in Jordan, but petty crime is prevalent in the downtown Amman Hashimiyah Square area and near the Roman Amphitheater. In the narrow streets of the older parts of the city center, crowded conditions invite pickpockets and other petty criminals. Travelers are urged to be more guarded in these areas so that they do not present easy opportunities for criminals.

In central and west Amman, there have been reports of thieves snatching pedestrians' purses from moving vehicles and then driving off. In some instances, victims were injured when they were unable to free themselves from their purses. When carrying a purse, it would be wise to conceal it if possible, to avoid walking near the

road within reach of passing vehicles, and to walk against the flow of traffic.

Jordanian police have warned the public to exercise vigilance when leaving banks or ATM machines, as thieves have reportedly preyed upon persons soon after using these services.

Western women both visiting and residing in Jordan report sexual harassment, stalking, and unwelcome advances of a sexual nature; there have been isolated reports of assault. Women are advised to take reasonable precautions including dressing conservatively and not traveling alone. Modest attire should be worn in deference to local custom.

¶10. (U) TRAVEL GUIDELINES: American citizens and official visitors traveling in Jordan should exercise caution, be alert, and stay informed of regional and local events that could quickly impact the security environment in the country. It is also recommended to maintain a low profile and not establish predictable patterns of movement, even if only visiting for a short period. Yellow taxis are widely used throughout the country and for the most part without adverse incidents occurring. Still, there have been confirmed reports of single females being assaulted or verbally harassed by taxi drivers. The Embassy Internet website has a list of radio controlled taxi companies that the Government of Jordan has advised us vet their drivers at http://amman.usembassy.gov/int_dev/taxi_list.pdf.

For further information, see the State Department's Consular Information Sheet for Jordan at <http://www.travel.state.gov>, click the "Travel Information by Country" hyperlink to get the most recent Public Announcements on Travel in the Middle East and South Asia and the most recent Worldwide Caution.

Visit Amman's Classified Web Site at <http://www.state.gov.sgov.gov/p/nea/amman/>

HALE